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This paper develops a framework for studying individuals’ ideas about what constitutes just 
compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) and reports estimates of just CEO pay and 
the principles guiding ideas of justice. The sample consists of students pursuing a Master of 
Business Administration (MBA) degree in Sweden and the United States. The framework, 
based on justice theory and making use of Rossi’s factorial survey method, enables 
assessment of ideas of fairness in CEO compensation, including (1) the just CEO 
compensation, in the eyes of each observer; (2) the principles of microjustice – observers’ 
ideas about “who should get what” based on characteristics of CEOs and their firms; and (3) 
principles of macrojustice – ideas about the just level and dispersion in compensation across 
all CEOs. Our estimates yield the following main results: First, there is broad agreement on 
the median just CEO compensation but substantial inter-individual variation in the principles 
of microjustice and the other principles of macrojustice. Second, there is remarkable similarity 
in the distributions of the principles of microjustice and macrojustice across the MBA groups. 
Other important results include a pervasive gender attentiveness among MBA students and 
tolerance for large variability in CEO pay. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Recent increases in inequality in many countries of the world appear due to the increasing
concentration of wealth at the top; and the increasing concentration of wealth at the top is in turn
widely attributed to a new phenomenon in economic life, namely, very high-earning salaried
workers, in particular, chief executive officers (Atkinson and Piketty 2006; Piketty and Saez
2006; Roine and Waldenström 2006).
Wealth and inequality awaken justice concerns.  Substantial gaps between what people
think is just and what they see around them generate judgments of injustice, setting in motion a
train of negative consequences for individual and society (Bok 1993).  Of course, ideas of justice
may differ across individuals and across societies and their subgroups.  Elites constitute one
potentially important segment of the population, not only because of their decisionmaking
activities but also because they may share a global common culture.  Students pursuing a Master
of Business Administration (MBA) degree are a special group of interest.  The MBA students of
today are the future CEOs, board members, entrepreneurs, and investors.  Thus, their ideas about
what is fair compensation, their views of the relevant factors in setting CEO compensation, and
their tolerance or intolerance of  inequality provide an important glimpse into the societal
conversation on matters of compensation and inequality in the years to come.  Moreover, to the
extent that students come from all over the world, variability within university may reflect the
diversity of their origins; across universities and countries, commonality may reflect the
emerging global common culture while variability may reflect persistent distinctive ideas of
justice and tolerance for inequality (Bok 1993; Kelley and Evans 1993; Master 2002; Söderström
et al. 2003; Svallfors 1997; Wegener 1991).
In this paper we focus on CEO compensation as viewed by MBA students at two
universities, one in Sweden, the other in the United States, asking three main questions:  First,
what are MBA students’ ideas about fairness in CEO compensation – including not only ideas of
the just amounts of pay but also ideas about the just returns to personal and firm characteristics
(microjustice) and about the just level and dispersion in CEO pay (macrojustice)?  Second, do  The words “justice” and “fairness” and their cognates are used interchangeably.
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MBA students within a university have a common view about what constitutes just CEO pay,
just returns, and just level and dispersion?  Third, are these ideas of justice similar across the two
universities?
1
To address these questions, we develop a framework which is based on justice theory and
makes use of Rossi’s factorial survey method, building on early studies of the justice of earnings
(Jasso and Rossi 1977) and of elites (Berk and Rossi 1977; Jasso 1988).  The framework links
observers’ ideas of justice, principles of microjustice, and principles of macrojustice, enabling
estimation of these observer-specific quantities and assessment of the mix of agreements and
disagreements across respondents.
The paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2 we describe the framework and its
theoretical and empirical background.  The method used in the present study is developed in
Section 3.  Section 4 reports the results.  A short discussion concludes the paper.
2.  JUSTICE JUDGMENTS OF CEO COMPENSATION:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
The work reported in this paper builds on and contributes to two research traditions, the
first focused on large questions of increasing income inequality and attendant dynamics and the
second on fairness concerns.  Both converge on executive compensation and elites.  The fairness
literature suggests that two distinct kinds of principles operate to produce ideas of the just
reward:  (1) principles of microjustice – ideas about “who should get what” -- and (2) principles
of macrojustice – ideas about what the overall distribution should look like (Arts et al. 1991;
Berger et al. 1972; Brickman et al. 1981; Jasso 1983).  That literature also suggests that ideas of
justice are “in the eyes of the beholder” (Walster et al. 1976:4) and thus shaped by the observer’s
own characteristics, social location, and societal characteristics (Kelley and Evans 1993;
Svallfors 1997; Verwiebe and Wegener 2000).  Both literatures highlight the income domain  Succinct summary of the larger inequality framework is found in Piketty and Saez
2
(2006) and of the justice framework in Jasso and Wegener (1997) and Jasso (1999, 2007).
3
(1)
(Arts et al. 1991; Atkinson and Piketty 2006; Bok 1993; Jasso and Rossi 1977; Kelley and Evans
1993; Piketty and Saez 2006).
2
2.1.  Justice
Justice theory identifies four main elements in justice processes.  First, individuals and
societies form ideas of justice; in the distributive-retributive domain these are ideas about what
constitutes the just reward for specified rewardees, who can be self or other.  Second, these ideas
of justice may be used to help shape actual situations; for example, ideas of the just reward may
play a part in salary decisions.  Third, individuals judge the justice or injustice of actual
situations, generating the justice evaluation; for example, they may judge that one person is
overpaid and another underpaid and/or that the pay structure in a firm has unjustly too much
inequality.  Fourth, the justice evaluations become important determinants of further behaviors,
such as lobbying for policies or candidates.
This paper is chiefly concerned with ideas of the just reward for CEOs.  However, the
method used to estimate the just reward is an indirect method that utilizes the justice evaluation
function.  Accordingly, we provide a brief background not only on the just reward but also on the
justice evaluation and their associated functions.
Just Reward Function and the Principles of Microjustice.  The just reward is the
observer’s idea of the just reward for a particular rewardee.  It can be expressed as a function of
characteristics of the rewardee and the rewardee’s situation.  This representation of the just
reward function is owed to Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen (1972), as shown in Jasso
(1983), and is thus called the BZAC function.  Of course, observers may disagree as to which
worker/situational characteristics are relevant for just earnings or about the worth of such
characteristics.  Accordingly, we write a general just reward function:
where C denotes the just reward and X denotes a vector of rewardee and situational4
(2)
characteristics.  To illustrate, in the earnings realm, C represents just earnings, and the X vector
contains both worker characteristics and situational characteristics, such as geographic region and
industrial sector; some of the characteristics in the X vector may be salient to some observers and
ignored by others.
The parameters of the BZAC just reward function (e.g., intercept and slope coefficients)
represent just rates of return – for example, just rate of return to schooling and just rate of return
to experience, as well as a just gender multiplier, and so on.  Following Brickman et al. (1981),
these quantities, which guide determination of the just reward in the observer’s head, are
collectively called the principles of microjustice.
Just Reward Distribution and the Principles of Macrojustice.  When an observer
forms ideas about the just reward for a set of rewardees, these ideas are also guided by
distributional considerations, and these considerations are visible in the distribution formed by
the set of just rewards.  Following Brickman et al. (1981), parameters of the observer-specific
just reward distribution – such as its mean and inequality – are called the principles of
macrojustice.
Justice Evaluation Function.  The justice evaluation is the observer’s assessment that a
rewardee (self or other) is fairly or unfairly rewarded and, if unfairly rewarded, whether
underrewarded or overrewarded, and to what degree.  The justice evaluation, denoted J, arises
from the comparison between an actual reward and a just reward.  It is usually specified as the
logarithm of the ratio of the actual reward, denoted A, to the just reward, denoted, as before, C
(Jasso 1978, 1999, 2006):
where   denotes the signature constant.  The sign of   is called the framing coefficient, because
it embodies the observer’s framing of the reward as a good or as a bad (negative for a bad,
positive for a good); and the absolute value of   is called the expressiveness coefficient, because
it transforms the observer’s experience of justice into the expression thereof.  The log-ratio form  For fuller discussion of properties of the justice evaluation function, see Jasso (2007).
3
  In the behavioral model in (3), the justice evaluation function appears in its theoretical
4
form, i.e., without an error term.  Below it will be transformed into an empirically estimable
form, including an error term.
5
(3)
of the justice evaluation function has many appealing properties, and has been shown to be the
only functional form which simultaneously satisfies two important conditions, scale invariance
and additivity (Jasso 1990).
3
Note that the justice evaluation serves to link the twin pillars of the justice literature: 
ideas of justice and reactions to injustice.  Ideas of justice, as seen in equation (2), are one of the
two arguments of the justice evaluation function; and reactions to injustice are the consequences
of the justice evaluation.  Thus, the justice evaluation connects the two foundational themes in
the study of justice.
Two-Equation Model.  The method we use for estimating the just rewards is based on a
design in which each observer judges the justice or injustice of the actual reward associated with
each rewardee in a set of rewardees (Jasso and Rossi 1977; Jasso 1990, 2007).  Thus, the
underlying model is a two-equation model consisting of the justice evaluation function and the
just reward function (here written for a single observer):
where the justice evaluation, actual reward, just reward, and reward-relevant characteristics are
denoted by lower-case letters, r indexes the rewardee, ð denotes the parameters of the just reward
function, and  is a classical error distributed independently with zero mean and constant
variance (within the respondent-specific equation).
4
As will be described in section 3.2, estimation of the observer-specific justice evaluation
equation (the first equation in expression (3)), in which the just rewards are unobserved, yields an
estimate of the signature constant  , which is then used to calculate the true observer-6
specific/rewardee-specific just reward  .  These estimated just rewards become the dependent
variable in the observer-specific just reward equation (the second equation in expression (3)),
which in turn yields estimates of the observer-specific principles of microjustice.  Concomitantly,
calculation of the mean and inequality measures in the observer-specific just reward distribution
yields estimates of the observer-specific principles of macrojustice.
2.2.  Justice of CEO Compensation
People make justice judgments about a wide variety of rewardees, including self and
others, the latter both known and unknown to them.  It is a commonplace – and much expressed
in private conversations, letters to the editor of newspapers and periodicals, radio talk shows,
and, now, web logs – that this or that athlete is overpaid and this or that actor is underpaid, etc.
CEOs are among the rewardees the justice of whose rewards is much evaluated.  Several
themes are discernible in public discussion of CEO compensation.  First, the levels of CEO
compensation are perceived as high; for example, the median CEO compensation in 2001 was
$7.1 million, and the distribution is highly positively skewed (Söderström et al. 2003).  Second,
compensation differentials – say, between a nurse and a CEO – appear to many to be
disproportionate.  Third, CEO compensation increased dramatically in the last two decades of the
twentieth century – for example, in the United States averaging 9% per year in the period
1980–1998 and outpacing not only compensation increases for rank and file workers but also the
pay growth of 3.7% per year among the wealthiest Americans (Hall and Liebman 1998; Piketty
and Saez 2006).  Fourth, CEOs appear to have lost the trust of the general population; the
prevailing image is that of a CEO negotiating large compensation packages while fraudulently
and criminally misrepresenting corporate performance for personal gain (Meyer 2003).  Fifth, the
system of corporate governance, in particular the set of checks and balances, has become a focus
of criticism.
Of course, not all justice evaluations conclude with a verdict of overreward.  For
example, Crystal’s (2002) analysis of executive compensation in companies with 2001 revenue
of $8 billion or more concluded that three of the CEOs are underpaid – including Warren Buffet  Because the target CEOs in our study are newly hired as a CEO, we do not explicitly
5
examine performance pay sensitivity, as is typical in the research literature (e.g., Murphy 1999).
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of Berkshire Hathaway, whose business acumen is matched by his sense of ethics and fair play.
The scholarly literature on the justice of CEO compensation is anchored by two
pioneering data collection efforts – the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the
International Justice Research Project (ISJP) – which have obtained information concerning what
respondents regard as the just pay for “chairman of a large national corporation” and “chairman
of a large company,” respectively (Jasso 2007).  However, these data do not lend themselves to
estimating just pay for a broader range of CEOs – such as CEOs of small firms or multinational
corporations.  Moreover, they do not permit nuanced judgments that take into account personal
characteristics of the CEO such as age or gender or other firm characteristics such as industry –
that is, they do not permit estimation of just reward functions and the principles of microjustice.
Accordingly, we use the factorial-survey justice design developed by Jasso and Rossi
(1977) in order to achieve greater specificity.  We specify a just compensation function that
parallels the actual compensation functions discussed in the literature.  The just compensation
function includes characteristics of CEOs and of their firms which figure in both the actual
compensation literature and in justice discussions, such characteristics as the age, gender,
schooling, and experience of the CEO and the size and location of the firm (Baker and Hall 2004;
Boxman et al. 1991; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Meyersson 1994; Murphy 1999; O’Reilly and
O’Neill 2003; Rosen 1992).  In the first application of the framework developed in this paper, we
focus on CEOs newly hired as a CEO.
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2.3.  MBA Students and the Justice of CEO Compensation
MBA students occupy a crossroads in the justice and CEO landscape.  Like their fellows
from high school and in common with the broader population, they judge the justice of CEO
compensation.  But unlike the broader population, they may have aspirations to become a CEO
or take on other positions within the corporate world.  And they have taken a significant step in
the direction of casting their lot with business.  Discerning their ideas of justice about CEO8
compensation provides a glimpse into the mindset of future entrepreneurs, CEOs, and board
members.  Note that to the extent that MBA students are drawn from around the world, they
represent an international elite and thus their views may reflect both their national origins and
their common global culture.
3.  METHOD:  FACTORIAL SURVEY ANALYSIS
AND JUSTICE JUDGMENTS OF CEO COMPENSATION
To learn what MBA students regard as just compensation for CEOs and to estimate the
justice principles guiding their judgments, we use Rossi’s factorial survey method (Rossi 1979;
Rossi and Anderson 1982; Rossi and Berk 1985; Jasso 2006), which has proved especially useful
in studies of distributive justice, making it possible to obtain justice judgments about large sets of
richly described fictitious rewardees (Berk and Rossi 1977; Jasso and Rossi 1977; Jasso 2007). 
The general factorial survey method provides several avenues for obtaining respondents’ ideas of
the just reward, including a direct method and (two versions of) an indirect method (Jasso 2007). 
The research reported here used the one-reward-per-rewardee version of the indirect method, in
which a hypothetical actual reward is randomly attached to each rewardee, and respondents
assess the fairness or unfairness of the actual rewards.  The indirect method yields estimates of
the just reward that are uncontaminated by socialization, rhetorical, political-correctness, or other
disclosure mechanisms.
Briefly, we presented to respondents a set of 40 hypothetical CEOs, described in terms of
own and firm characteristics, including a random compensation amount, and we asked the
respondents to rate the justice or relative injustice of the hypothetical earnings.  We used the
obtained justice evaluations to estimate for each respondent the amount he or she thinks just for
each of the hypothetical CEOs (the method involves a two-step procedure, described below). 
Next we used the estimated just compensation amounts to estimate for each respondent the
principles of microjustice and macrojustice guiding his/her judgments.9
3.1.  Data Collection in the Factorial Survey Analysis of CEO Compensation
The design of the data collection has three main ingredients: a sample of respondents, a
population of hypothetical CEOs (the “vignettes”) from which random samples are drawn and
randomly assigned to respondents, and a rating task.
3.1.1.  Vignette Samples
Vignette Characteristics.  The vignettes include CEO and firm characteristics, plus a
hypothetical amount of total direct compensation proposed for the CEO’s first year as CEO of
this firm.  Total direct compensation consists of base salary, bonus, restricted stock and long-
term incentives -- everything except stock option grants.  MBA students would be familiar with
these components of executive compensation.
Levels/values of vignette characteristics.  Table 1 presents the vignette characteristics,
together with their levels and values.  As shown, age varies from 20 years to 70 years, schooling
from completion of sixth grade to a doctoral degree, CEO compensation from fifty thousand to
sixty million dollars.  Of course, the real world is sufficiently diverse that most of the values in
the vignettes have real-world counterparts.  For example, in 2004, excluding those CEOs who at
their request received total compensation of one dollar, CEO compensation in the top 500 U.S.
companies ranged from $ 82,000 to $ 230,554,000 (www.forbes.com).
– Table 1 about here –
Firm headquarters is specified as being in one of three locations -- the United States,
Europe, and Asia.  The vignettes describe the CEO’s firm as being in one of four major industries
– manufacturing, finance and insurance, information, and wholesale trade.
Population of vignettes and drawing vignette samples.  To obtain the random samples
of vignettes to present to respondents, we followed these procedures:  First, we fully crossed all
characteristics except sex.  The number of possible vignettes (Cartesian product) is:  
11 × 15 × 16 × 3 × 4 × 27 × 27 = 23,094,720.  Second, we eliminated logically impossible
combinations, following the specifications given in the note to Table 1; for example, age and
experience as a CEO could not yield a CEO who became a CEO before age 16.  Third, we drew10
two random samples, each of size 20 (called Decks 1 and 2).  Fourth, each of the two random
samples was used to generate two mirror-image samples with respect to sex, one describing men,
the other women (e.g., Deck 1 gives rise to two decks, the all-female Deck 1a and the all-male
Deck 1b).  Finally, two superdecks of size 40 were constructed by taking the male version of one
sample and the female version of the other sample, and vice-versa (e.g., Deck 1a and Deck 2b
form one superdeck).
Thus, each respondent received a pack with 40 vignettes.  Though the 20 male and 20
female CEOs in each respondent’s pack are not mirror images of each other, across all
respondents the male and female CEOs are indeed mirror images of each other.
3.1.2.  Rating Task
The respondent was asked to rate the justice or injustice of the hypothetical salary
randomly attached to each CEO.  The rating task used a number-matching technique developed
by S. S. Stevens (1975), which gives respondents maximal freedom to map the subjective justice
continuum onto numbers.  The number zero is used to represent perfect justice, negative numbers
to represent unjust underpayment, and positive numbers to represent unjust overpayment.
The usual protocol for factorial survey studies was followed (Jasso 2006, 2007).  The
instructions were read aloud, examples provided, questions answered.  The instructions, besides
describing the justice evaluation rating task, highlight the randomness of the attached
hypothetical actual earnings and, to activate the full real-number line, make explicit mention of
fractions and decimals; as well, to preserve independence of the ratings, the instructions say that
respondents may change any of their ratings.  Facsimiles of the instructions and of a vignette
appear in Jasso (2006:412, 415).
The rating provided by the respondent for each rewardee is the justice evaluation
described above (equation (2)) and produced by a comparison of the actual reward included in
the vignette with the respondent’s own idea of the just reward for the particular rewardee.
3.1.3.  Respondent Samples




from a U.S. institution.  The two institutions have similar curriculums, and the courses have
similar content.  Both institutions have a diverse student body drawing both from different
domestic ethnicities and different origin countries.  The proportion women is low to moderate in
the two institutions, approximately 14% in the Swedish institution and 26% in the U.S.
institution.  In both institutions, we conducted the survey in the largest core course.
3.2.  Estimating the Just CEO Compensation
As noted, we use the one-reward-per-rewardee version of the indirect method to estimate
the amount of compensation that each respondent regards as just for each fictitious CEO.
The first step is to estimate the justice evaluation equation in the two-equation model
(expression (3)), written, as before, for a single respondent:
To begin, we transform the theoretical justice evaluation equation in (4), which has no error and
in which the true just reward is unobserved, into an estimable empirical form, re-writing it as a
simple regression equation with a stochastic term  ,
where   obeys the classical assumptions.  Because the respondent’s ideas of the just reward for
each fictitious rewardee are unobserved, they are absorbed into the regression intercept  , which
can be shown, by properties of linear regression, to amalgamate all the unobserved true just
rewards:
This means that great care must be exercised in the estimation of (5) to guard against omitted-
variables bias, which would arise if there is a correlation between the actual rewards and the
unobserved just rewards.  The steps taken to guard against such error are, first, ensure that the
correlation of the actual reward and the reward-relevant characteristics (the CEO and firm
characteristics) is zero in the vignette population, and, second, make clear to the respondents that
the actual reward is random, stating this explicitly (“Each CEO has been randomly assigned a
hypothetical total compensation for the first year.”).12
(7)
Accordingly, estimation, for each respondent separately, of the empirical justice
evaluation function in (5) yields an estimate of the signature constant  , from which the framing
and expressiveness coefficients are immediately obtained.
Because in the factorial survey the descriptions of the rewardees are designed by the
investigator and the actual reward is uncorrelated with the reward-relevant characteristics, the
regressor   is fixed in the statistical sense and uncorrelated with the error, and, hence, the
estimate of the signature constant   has the desirable properties of unbiasedness and consistency.
To estimate the true just reward, we re-arrange the terms in the justice evaluation
equation in expression (4), obtaining the formula for estimating the true just reward:
where   denotes the exponential function.  Accordingly, when the justice evaluation
equation is combined with the factorial survey design developed by Jasso and Rossi (1977), the
factorial survey justice design provides the actual reward, the justice evaluation is obtained from
the respondent, and the signature constant is estimated via statistical estimation of the equation
(as shown above), leaving only one unknown – the just reward – which is easily solved for.  The
just rewards obtained by this method, being nonlinear transformations of an unbiased and
consistent estimate -- of the signature constant -- lose unbiasedness but, by Slutsky's theorem,
remain consistent.  Thus, estimates obtained by the one-reward-per-rewardee version of the
indirect method have the desirable properties that they are free of disclosure bias and that they
are consistent but the undesirable property that they are biased.  To mitigate bias and achieve the
benefits of consistency, sample size is important.  Though more research is needed to gauge
optimal sample sizes, an initial rule is that vignettes number at least forty.
3.3.  Estimating the Principles of Microjustice and Macrojustice:
Just Reward Functions and Just Reward Distributions
To estimate the respondent-specific just reward functions, we regress, separately for each
respondent, the natural logarithm of just CEO compensation (estimated via formula (7)) on the
CEO and firm characteristics.  The obtained estimates, or transformations thereof, constitute  The three models are labeled as in Johnston and DiNardo (1997:129-130).
6
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estimates of the respondent-specific principles of microjustice.
To illustrate, the coefficient of schooling provides an estimate of the just earnings return
to investment in an additional year of schooling.  Age and experience are each represented by a
quadratic form (i.e., by two regressors, such as age and age-squared), so that the just return to age
or to experience is estimated by the two coefficients jointly.  The exponential of the coefficient of
the binary sex variable, measures the gender multiplier; women are coded “1" and thus the
multiplier is applied to the earnings of females, so that subtracting one yields the tax (if negative)
or bonus (if positive) on women's earnings, relative to the earnings of comparable men, in
percentage points.  The gender multiplier has a natural interpretation as the ratio of female to
male earnings; a gender multiplier of .8 would indicate the view that the just earnings for a
woman is 80% of the just earnings for a comparable man.
To test homogeneity of the respondent-specific just reward equations, we estimate three
models and perform three tests contrasting them.   Model I specifies a pooled equation in which
6
all respondents have the same intercept and the same slopes.  Model II retains common slopes
but allows each respondent to have a unique intercept.  Model III is the set of respondent-specific
equations in which each respondent has both a unique intercept and unique slopes.  Test 1
contrasts Model I with Model II.  Test 2 contrasts Model II with Model III.  Test 3 contrasts
Model I with Model III.
The observer-specific just rewards form the just reward distribution.  To estimate the
principles of macrojustice, we calculate, for each respondent-specific distribution, the mean,
median, and four measures of inequality.
4.  RESULTS
4.1.  Preliminaries
Of the 47 respondents in the Swedish study, 45 provided numerical nonconstant ratings,  Factorial survey justice studies since the earliest days have found evidence of
7
“contrarian” individuals, e.g., persons who regard earnings as a bad or time in prison as a good –
exemplifying the old adage that one person’s meat is another’s poison.  Deleting contrarians
removes one source of variability, producing more conservative homogeneity tests.
14
and of these, 43 provided information on gender (27 males and 16 females).  Twenty-six of the
27 men and 13 of the 16 women rated all 40 vignettes; only 6 vignettes were left unrated, and the
fewest number rated was 38.  Estimation of the justice evaluation equations indicated that one
male and one female each regarded earnings as a bad.   These two respondents were dropped,
7
leaving a usable Swedish sample of 26 males and 15 females.
In the U.S. sample, all 36 respondents provided numerical nonconstant ratings as well as
gender information (30 males and 6 females).  However, there are too few female respondents to
constitute a female sample.  Moreover, one of the men rated fewer than 30 vignettes and was
eliminated, leaving a usable U.S. male sample of size 29.  Twenty-four of the 29 men rated all 40
vignettes; one each rated 31, 34, and 35 vignettes, and 2 rated 39 vignettes.
Accordingly, the data to be analyzed include three subsamples and enable a contrast
between male MBA students in Sweden and in the United States and a second contrast between
male and female MBA students in Sweden.
4.2.  Estimates of Just CEO Compensation
Using the procedure described above, we estimated for each respondent the amount of
compensation he/she thought just for each of the CEOs.  The estimates are arrayed in a just
reward matrix.  To illustrate, Table 2 reports a portion of the just earnings matrix, showing the
just earnings amounts for a quarter of the vignettes, namely ten each from two mirror-image
decks.  Our focus in this paper is on the rows of the matrix – namely, the respondent-specific just
reward distributions to which we return in section 4.4 below.  Of course, the rewardee-specific
just reward distributions in the columns can also be usefully investigated
– Table 2 about here --
4.3.  Principles of Microjustice
We begin by estimating the respondent-specific just reward equations.  For each15
respondent, the forty logged just earnings amounts are regressed on the CEO and firm
characteristics.  Next, we carry out the homogeneity tests described in section 3.3, separately
within each of the three samples.  In all three samples, all three tests reject homogeneity at very
high levels of statistical significance (beyond the .0001 level).  We conclude that in forming their
ideas of just compensation respondents differ in the weights they attach to CEO and firm
characteristics.
As a brief illustration, consider the results for the Swedish male sample (Table 3);
corresponding tables for the other two samples are available from the authors.  The value of R-
squared in the Model I equation, which constrains all respondents to have the same intercept and
the same slopes, is a meager .113.  Model II, which allows respondents to have unique intercepts,
attains a value of R-squared of .346, or triple that in Model I.  Model III, which permits
respondents to have their own intercepts and slopes, reaches an R-squared of .591, which almost
doubles that in Model II and is over 5 times that in Model I.
– Table 3 about here –
Thus, the homogeneity tests yield the first important result:  MBA students, even within
country and within gender, do not agree with each other on the just bases for CEO compensation. 
As will be discussed, this may reflect the students’ international origins and/or their
independence of mind.
To assess the extent of agreements and disagreements, we examine the respondent-
specific equation estimates.  For each respondent, we have estimates of twelve coefficients, one
intercept, and one value of R-squared.  The thirteen parameter estimates satisfy the conditions for
unbiasedness.  We summarize the results in two ways.  First, we present in panel A of Table 4
summary characteristics of all the coefficients plus R-squared.  Second, we present graphs of the
sample-specific quantile functions associated with several of the measures.  The quantile
function plots the value of a variable on its cumulative relative frequency, so that it is visually
evident what proportion of respondents have values smaller than the plotted values.  These plots
permit immediate assessment of interrespondent disagreements and of similarity or dissimilarity  Such a common Weltanschauung should not be too surprising, given that MBA
8
students the world over have a similar curriculum.  Moreover, asked about their major sources of
business information, MBA students at both institutions mentioned the same three periodicals: 
The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, and The Economist.  Further, both institutions
draw students from all over the world.




of the distributions across the three samples.
– Table 4 about here --
  Before discussing the estimates of the respondent-specific just CEO compensation
equations, we inspect their values of R-squared (panel A of Table 4 and Figure 1).  As shown, the
values of R-squared range from .142 to .726.  The means and medians in all three samples hover
between .44 and .49.  These are substantial magnitudes, indicating that, although the respondents
may disagree with each other on the importance associated with particular CEO and firm
characteristics, they have coherent and orderly views concerning the effects of CEO and firm
characteristics on just CEO compensation.  As well, the values of R-squared indicate that the
particular set of CEO and firm characteristics included in the vignettes are indeed relevant to the
just pay for CEOs, in the respondents’ eyes.
– Figure 1 about here –
Figure 1 tells an additional story.  Notice how close together the three sample-specific
distributions lie.  Although there is considerable variability within sample, the three samples are
very similar.  These results suggest a common Weltanschauung among MBA students in both the
Swedish and the U.S. institutions.
8
The effect of CEO gender on just compensation is represented by the gender multiplier
(Table 4, panel B, and Figure 2, panel A).  As shown, the medians are in the range .84-.94,
indicating that the median respondent regards as just an amount for women that is 84% to 94%
that of otherwise identical male CEOs.  Again, the three distributions are very similar to each
other, parting company only at the extremes, especially the upper extreme.
9
– Figure 2 about here –  The quintessential example of entrepreneurial college dropouts is Bill Gates, founder
10
of Microsoft.  Another well-known example is Michael Dell, founder of Dell Computer (Dell
2003).
  The plots omit a total of three values (from the graphs but not from the underlying
11
distributions) – one each at the bottom and top in the Swedish male sample, and one at the top in
the Swedish female sample.
17
The respondent-specific estimates for the just rate of return to schooling (Table 4, panels
A and B, Figure 2, panel B) indicate not only the large individual differences already expected
but also somewhat less similarity across the three samples, especially in the bottom half of the
distributions.  The median just rate of return to schooling is substantially higher among the
Swedish men (9.5%) than among the Swedish women and U.S. men (5.5% and 5.3%,
respectively).  Swedish women also have the bottom third of the distribution with lower just
returns than U.S. men.  These results echo currents in the compensation literature, including the
glory stories of entrepreneurial college dropouts, the view of schooling as a credentialing device,
and the notion that schooling may be consumption as well as investment.
10
The parabolas representing operation of experience as a CEO are concave downwards in
a majority of each sample (65%, 73%, and 59%, respectively, among Swedish men, Swedish
women, and U.S. men).  For these subsets, we show the quantile function of the sample-specific
distributions of the years of experience at which just compensation peaks (Figure 2, panel C).  
11
Thus, these respondents judge as just a starting compensation for newly-hired CEOs that notices
previous experience as a CEO but that peaks at a median experience of 6-9 years.
The firm location variables give rise to six possible orderings.  The two orderings in
which the United States is thought to provide larger just compensation characterize a plurality of
respondents in all three samples, although the two orderings in which Asia has the larger
coefficient is a strong contender among the U.S. male sample.  Among the two Swedish samples,
the two orderings with Asia at the top characterize the fewest number of respondents.  These
results suggest that in forming ideas of just compensation for CEOs, our respondents take into
account the location of the firm headquarters but they disagree concerning which locations make  As suggested by inspection of the graphs and tabulated figures, there is one omitted
12
value at the bottom of the range (among the U.S. men) and several at the top (one among
Swedish men, three among Swedish women, and four among U.S. men).
18
high earnings more appropriate.
The firm industry variables give rise to 24 possible orderings.  All but one of the 24
possible orderings were used by at least one respondent.  In each sample, the largest number of
respondents associated with a single ordering are 4, 5, and 3 among Swedish men, Swedish
women, and U.S. men, respectively.
The estimates for the effect of firm capitalization on just CEO compensation (Table 4,
panel A, and Figure 2, panel D) show the now familiar pattern associated with the effects of
quantitative characteristics – variability across individuals, similarity across samples.   The
12
medians lie in the range .14-.26.  Thus, on average, respondents regard as just a CEO
compensation that increases by approximately .20% for a 1% increase in firm capitalization.  In
the vocabulary of economics, the estimated elasticity of CEO just compensation with respect to
firm capitalization is in the range of .14 to .26 – a range consistent with Rosen’s (1992) estimated
range of .20 to .30.  Interestingly, the estimates in the two men’s samples are even more similar
to Rosen’s estimates – a mean and median of the estimated elasticities of .23-.24 and .18-.26,
respectively. 
4.4.  Principles of Macrojustice
Table 4 reports in panel C summary characteristics for the median and for the four
inequality measures calculated on the respondent-specific just reward distributions.  Graphs of
the sample-specific quantile functions associated with the median and with the inequality
measures are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
– Figures 3 and 4 about here –
The plots for the medians of the respondent-specific just reward distributions (Figure 3)
indicate interrespondent similarity over most of the region. Moreover, the three plots are very
similar, indicating similarity across the three samples.   This pattern differs from the pattern19
observed in the principles of microjustice of within-sample variability combined with cross-
sample similarity; here we observe similarity both within and across samples.
The graphs of the inequality measures (Table 4), however, display the same pattern as the
principles of microjustice – great variability across respondents, great similarity across samples. 
Substantively, respondents regard as fair very high levels of inequality in CEO compensation. 
Most of the minimums are quite high – for example, the smallest values of the Gini index among
Swedish men and women are .46 and .50, respectively, values higher than in the broader U.S.
income distribution.  The means and medians are in the range of .76-.78.  At the upper extremes
of the distributions, the magnitudes approach unity, the theoretical upper limit of the Gini index.
In the MLD, however, there is some dissimilarity across the three samples, albeit
confined to the top half of the distribution.  Swedish women appear tolerant of greater inequality
(higher MLD).
In sum, the levels of inequality in CEO compensation that respondents regard as just are
quite high.
5.  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we developed a framework for studying individuals’ ideas about what
constitutes just compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs), and we reported the results of
the first application of the framework, assessing MBA students’ ideas about just CEO pay,
focusing on three samples: Swedish men, Swedish women, and U.S. men.
Our main results are:  First, we obtained estimates of each respondent’s ideas of the just
pay for each of 40 fictitious CEOs, of each respondent’s just reward equation and the principles
of microjustice, and of each respondent’s just reward distribution and the principles of
macrojustice.  These results make it possible to construct characterizations of respondents and
CEOs, for example, that one respondent regards as just a return to schooling of 10 percent and
another a return to schooling of 20 percent, that one respondent regards as just a Gini of .5 and
another a Gini of .982, and so on.  Second, within each of the three samples, there is substantial20
inter-individual variation in the principles of microjustice; that is, in forming ideas of just CEO
pay, people differ in the weights they place on CEO and firm characteristics.  Third, there is
remarkable similarity in the distributions of the principles of microjustice across the three
samples.  Fourth, within each sample, there is broad agreement on the median just CEO
compensation but substantial inter-individual variation in the inequality subset of the principles
of macrojustice; that is, people differ in their tolerance for inequality.  Fifth, there is remarkable
similarity in the distributions of the principles of macrojustice across the three samples.
 The estimates of the principles of justice provide an array of useful and suggestive
results.  For example, the distributions of observer-specific elasticity of just CEO compensation
with respect to firm capitalization have medians in the range of .14-.26 – similar to the range of
.20-.35 found by Rosen (1992).  Further, the median respondents regard as just an amount of pay
for women CEOs that is 84% to 94% that of otherwise identical male CEOs.  With respect to
variability in just CEO compensation, estimates of the principles of macrojustice indicate that the
MBA students regard as just rather high levels of inequality in CEO compensation (e.g., median
Gini index values of .76-.78), possibly dulling the senses to economic inequality in the larger
population, where a Gini of .50 would be considered too high by most observers.
The findings of substantial inter-respondent differences on the principles of justice and of
remarkable similarity in the distributions of principles of justice across the three samples jointly
provide evidence for the existence of a global business culture, but one which, consistent with
ideals of risk, innovation, and individualism, and possibly diverse origins, accommodates wide
individual differences.  Of course, the similarity we found between MBA students in Sweden and
the United States may not extend to the general populations of the two countries.  It is important
to monitor views of CEO pay both inside and outside the business world, for a global business
culture at odds with the general population would be a source of political tension both within and
between national cultures.
The findings on the effects of CEO gender on ideas of just pay suggest substantial gender
attentiveness on the part of MBA students.  The factorial survey method makes it possible to21
retrieve ideas of fairness that respondents might otherwise be reluctant to express.
Whether gender attentiveness among MBA students persists, increases, or diminishes is a
question for future research.  Recent studies carried out in college samples in the United States
(e.g., Jasso and Webster 1999) indicate that gender attentiveness is shifting.  While U.S. college
students increasingly assign equal just pay to otherwise identical male and female workers, they
are not completely blind to gender, for the mechanisms by which they generate ideas of just
earnings remain gender-attentive (for example, noticing gender in assigning just base pay or just
returns to schooling).  It will be important to monitor such shifts among MBA students.  The
factorial survey design is uniquely suited for this purpose.
There are several important directions for future research.  We highlight three. 
Methodologically, an important task is to systematically contrast direct and indirect methods for
measuring just pay, in order to understand the precise nature of the differences between them, to
calibrate results across studies, and to help in research design.  A second methodological task,
building on Jasso (2006:4003-4007), is to examine sensitivity of indirect methods to alternate
specifications of the justice evaluation function, assessing, for example, families of functions that
share major properties with the logarithmic-ratio function.
Substantively, an important question for future research is to document ideas of just CEO
pay among the general population as well as among other special target samples, such as
workers, union members, regulators, legislators, business school faculty, faculty and students in
other disciplines, and CEOs themselves, doing so not only in Sweden and the United States but
also in additional countries around the world and repeating such studies periodically.  Whether
the world as a whole is becoming more similar in its views, whether, alternatively, pockets of the
world’s population are becoming internally more similar but polarized vis-a-vis each other –
these are vital questions for social, economic, and political development and for the well-being of
the world’s people.22
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1.  Age





3.  Years of Schooling Completed
Fifteen levels, in increments of one year, from completion of sixth grade to a doctoral degree.
4.  Years as CEO
Sixteen levels, in increments of one year, from 0 to 15 years.




6.  Industry of This Firm
(1) Manufacturing
(2) Finance and insurance
(3) Information
(4) Wholesale trade
7.  Size of Firm – Capitalization
Twenty-seven levels, from $50 million to $600 billion.
[50m, 75m, 100m, 125m, 150m, 175m, 200m, 250m, 500m, 600m, 700m, 800m, 900m,
1b, 5b, 10b, 15b, 20b, 25b, 50b, 75b, 100b, 200b, 300b, 400b, 500b, 600b]
8.  CEO Total Compensation (salary, signing bonus, value of restricted stock, savings and
thrift plans, and other benefits, but excluding options)
Twenty-seven levels, from $50 thousand to $600 million.
[50t, 75t, 100t, 125t, 150t, 175t, 200t, 250t, 500t, 600t, 700t, 800t, 900t,
1m, 5m, 10m, 15m, 20m, 25m, 50m, 75m, 100m, 200m, 300m, 400m, 500m, 600m]
Note:  The population of fictitious CEOs  (called "vignettes") consists of all the logically possible
combinations of characteristics.  Logically impossible combinations are deleted.  These are
defined as meeting one of the following conditions: (i) age minus schooling LT 5; (ii) age minus
years as CEO LT 16; and (iii) capitalization/compensation LT 10.  Random samples are drawn
from the adjusted population for presentation to respondents.Table 2.  Estimated CEO Just Earnings Matrix:  Just Earnings (in Thousands of 2001$)
    for CEOs, as Judged by MBA Students, Sweden 2001
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Resp   |                                          CEO ID, Deck 1a                                  
    ID    |        1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9       10
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        1 |     1000   151523    18142   151523      175    11010     1783    19756     2469      390
        2 |      701      295     2349       63      222     1179      839     8516     1064     1863
        5 |      134     2785      449     1246      175      999      160      629      223      175
        7 |      104     2177       13      106      175      200      376      376      962      372
        9 |      537     1378      551     2567      401     5513     1211    11841     2241     3921
       11 |     2643       69     1872      483      175      731      800   103202      100      463
       15 |     1000      193       25      141      350      951      800     1599      283      350
       17 |      455    27385   120941     1170       36    22643     8512   199209      484    95846
       19 |      323      155      273      478      175      619      800     7652      956      541
       21 |     1000     3312     2277      549      175    13249    15992     8785      331     1056
       23 |      104      123      273     1182      175      776      638    12037    22639      275
       25 |     1000    90335      256      115      154     1606      985     1213      230      216
       27 |     9344     4365     2676     4365     1635    17461    18273    18273     8730     6250
       29 |     1000      234     2476    11018     3819      432      171    37736    22036     1767
       32 |     1000       75    16724       75      175      299     1196    44569     5571     1306
       34 |     1000     2697        9     2697      579     2189     5876    43154      149      389
       37 |      414      292      734     1703      504     1167     1620     9456      203      354
       39 |    10579     1359      574     1359      175     2116      800    34851    11192      175
       40 |        6      279      144       89       56      200      254     1419     3117       56
       42 |                       3003      144      297     1665      471     1359      289      505
       43 |        7      994      171      135       39      200      295      295      100      175
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Resp   |                                          CEO ID, Deck 1b                                  
    ID    |        1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9       10
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        3 |      202    30275     2263      248       35      992      800     5922      100      390
        4 |       44     3174      140      398      175     2677     6374   143339     1339      830
       10 |     1589      905    35389   529433    40516   418334 2.82e+10    12899 1.43e+27      557
       12 |      312     1646      237    16905     1128     2054      250     8217      100     1797
       14 |      149      335      215      129       16       77       18      309      100      175
       16 |      261      191       48       50      146      200      511      800      100      274
       18 |      290    24313     7254       93        8    20710      431     1485      470     3859
       20 |      558      925    13949      925       98    11881     1434     1434     1849     1008
       22 |    62147    18239     7683    18239     1027     3820      800     8470    36478     1853
       24 |     .102       50    25000       50      175      200      800      800      100      175
       26 |    42969        1   163877        1        1     1311      800   225332   184634     7520
       28 |        3     1382      395      174       76      303      152      800      100       76
       30 |      270      356     3508     2539      337      200      800     1539     2639      648
       31 |     1000     1712      730       50     5993     6849      800      800       17     1024
       33 |        4      777      310      259      175    48278      800   193111     1554      175
       35 |      782      134      622      317      210      370      432     2740     2171      175
       36 |     1000    33665       37      353      336   134660      800   538639               175
       38 |      400      230      257      575      175     5743      800    77879     2116      322
       44 |       62      803       97      803      175     9749      800   206264     1606     2810
       45 |        2       50     2178     1944       95      200       70      236      100      593
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:  Each respondent rated two twenty-vignette decks, either Deck 1a and Deck 2b or Deck 1b
and Deck 2a.  The ten CEOs shown are from Decks 1a and 1b (see text).  CEOs with the same ID
number are identical across these decks except for sex; the CEOs in Deck 1a are women and
those in Deck 1b are men.Table 3.  Summary of Estimated CEO Just Earnings Functions and Hypothesis Tests:
     Male MBA Students, Sweden 2001, 26 Respondents and 1039 Ratings
Model/Test F-ratio
(df)
Model I:  Common intercept and common slopes (13 parameters)
0.113 10.85
(12,  1026)
Model II:  Differential intercepts and common slopes (38 parameters)
0.346 14.32
(37, 1001)
Model III:  Differential intercepts and differential slopes (338 parameters)
0.591 3.00
(337, 701)
Test of differential intercepts, conditional on common slopes:  Model I vs. Model II
14.30
(25, 1001)
Test of differential slopes, conditional on differential intercepts:  Model II vs. Model III
1.40
(300, 701) 
Test of differential just earnings functions:  Model I vs. Model III
2.52
(325, 701)Table 4.  Summary Characteristics of Respondents’ Model III Equations and Selected Principles of Microjustice and Macrojustice:
    MBA Students, Sweden (2001) and the United States (2002)
Swedish Men Swedish Women U.S. Men
Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
A.  Respondents’ Model III Equations
Gender (1 = female) -.128 .806 -.0642 .0256 1.55 -.119 -.0249 1.39 -.180
Age .157 .177 .167 .0285 .602 .190 .209 .266 .149
Age-squared -.00154 .00175 -.00172 -.000372 .00564 -.00200 -.00208 .00271 -.00139
Years of schooling .0777 .0745 .0947 .0354 .118 .0549 .0528 .0878 .0528
Years as CEO .145 .234 .173 .426 .689 .271 .0355 .518 .0835
Years as CEO - squared -.00628 .0166 -.00737 -.0224 .0478 -.0132 -.00154 .0338 -.00559
Firm in Europe -.151 .740 -.134 -.416 .602 -.539 -.0547 .661 -.0668
Firm in Asia -.37 .839 -.220 -.428 1.18 -.519 .0179 1.15 -.0470
Firm in finance/insurance .119 .690 .0190 .869 .917 .998 -.146 1.34 -.0132
Firm in information -.00650 1.005 .0130 .640 1.16 .682 .235 .777 .174
Firm in wholesale trade -.182 .804 -.228 .665 1.70 -.00462 .251 1.02 .0534
Firm capitalization (log mil) .229 .203 .263 .382 .738 .138 .239 .280 .182
Constant -.856 4.45 -.749 .175 11.8 1.12 -1.34 6.57 .414
, just reward equation .491 .139 .466 .481 .140 .476 .440 .135 .436
B.  Principles of Microjustice
Just rate of return to school. .0777 .0745 .0947 .0354 .118 .0549 .0528 .0878 .0528
Just male base wage (2001K$) 27.0 60.6 .478 3.05 70.5 298.0 1.51
Just gender multiplier 1.15 .82 .938 9.01 31.3 .888 2.69 6.56 .835C.  Principles of Macrojustice
Just median CEO pay (2001K$) 1270.39 1891.8 959.503 22871.2 83600.2 715.026 1738.23 2921.5 858.862
Just Gini’s ratio .735 .175 .757 .776 .171 .783 .783 .173 .764
Just Theil’s ratio 1.42 1.02 1.13 1.61 1.06 1.31 1.68 1.03 1.23
Just Atkinson’s ratio .68 .229 .727 .753 .209 .744 .761 .220 .778
Just MLD 1.86 1.92 1.30 4.95 10.6 1.36 3.22 4.74 1.51Figure 2.  Respondent-Specific Principles of MicrojusticeFigure 4.  Respondent-Specific Principles of Macrojustice: Just Inequality